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Introduction
Researchers of the Holocaust are inclined to forget the Sinti and Roma. When the hypothesis of the singularity of the Holocaust towards the Jews is argued, this inclination can easily become habitual. As an outcome of the singularity hypothesis, there have been repeated controversial discussions as to whether the Sinti and Roma were victims of the genocidal plans of the National Socialists in the same way as the Jews. Romani Rose for example, the chairman of the Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma (Central Council of the German Sinti and Roma), insisted in an impassioned rejoinder to the speech of Yehuda Bauer on Holocaust Day in the German Bundestag in  that there were 'historical parallels' between the genocide of the Jews and that of the Sinti and Roma. e 'orders were the same' for both, he wrote, quoting a statement of Otto Ohlendorf, one of the Einsatzgruppen leaders (Rose ) . By contrast, in his reply to Rose, Yehuda Bauer emphasised the difference between the genocides and thus in the last resort pleaded for the singularity hypothesis (Bauer ). In view of this controversy, it seems worthwhile in pursuing the present enquiry to ask to what extent the treatment of the Sinti and Roma at the hands of the fiscal administration corresponded with the treatment of the Jews and whether there are differences and if so, where they lay.
For a long time the National Socialists' policy towards the Sinti und Roma (Zimmermann ; Lewy ) was quite diffuse, a mixture of traditional police 'Gypsy policy'-the criminal police ('Kripo') were responsible for the Sinti and Roma, not the Gestapo-and of 'racial hygiene' measures, even to the point of sterilisation. It was not until the outbreak of war that a stronger shi towards a 'final solution of the Gypsy question' became apparent. e first preparatory steps in this direction consisted of establishing a central register¹ and 'forcibly settling'² the Sinti and Roma in the Reich, who until then had frequently been 'itinerant' . Two great waves of deportation to the East then followed, which were exclusively directed against the Sinti and Roma: the first one in May , with , Sinti and Roma being deported from the western and northern regions of the Reich to the 'Generalgouvernement' (i.e. German-occupied Poland), still with the diffuse aim of achieving a 'territorial final solution' in occupied Poland; and a second one in March  to the so-called Gypsy family-camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Smaller transportations to Auschwitz followed until immediately before the camp was disbanded in the summer of .
Organising the transportations was the responsibility of the criminal police head offices (Reichskriminalpolizeileitstellen), that had been introduced         as agencies of the new Reich's criminal police in  and had been equipped with special units for Gypsy matters since .³ In Hannover, for example, there was the Gypsy Intelligence Service (Zigeunernachrichtenstelle), which was attached to the th Commissioner's office. Since this unit's files were destroyed just as thoroughly as the Gestapo files, here too the records of the fiscal administration are not only an excellent source for examining the bureaucratic robbery of the Sinti and Roma by the fiscal administration; at the same time they are one of the most important sources that exist for reconstructing the deportation of the Sinti and Roma. In the following, the structures and procedures used by the fiscal administration in dealing with the Sinti and Roma will be shown, mainly by looking at two case-studies within the jurisdiction area of the President of the Central Fiscal Authority (Oberfinanzpräsident, hereaer OFP) in Hannover: firstly the deportation of the Sinti from the administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) of Hildesheim to Auschwitz in March  and secondly the deportation of the carrier Wilhelm Friedrich and his family from Hannover in February , likewise to Auschwitz.
Case I: Deportation from Hildesheim to Auschwitz, March 
On  March ,  Sinti throughout the administrative district of Hildesheim were arrested by the criminal police at one swoop and brought to the Hildesheim police prison, where first of all their 'identities were checked' .⁴ e legal basis for this action was Himmler's so-called Auschwitz Decree of  December  and the detailed implementation order of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (hereaer RSHA, the central office of the security police, amalgamating various police and securitiy services) of  January , with which the final genocidal phase of the NS Gypsy policy was ushered in.⁵ ere were a striking number of children and youths among the victims in Hildesheim:  children under the age of  and five youths under , in other words, two-thirds of those deported were under-age. A group of six children and youths came from the provincial reformatory school in Göt-tingen, where male Sinti children from the Province of Hannover who were in corrective care had been assembled since .
e eldest among those arrested was  years old, the youngest was a girl of less than two years of age-neither of whom survived in Auschwitz till the end of the year. e arrestees were taken by bus to Braunschweig on the day aer their arrest, whence they were transported to Auschwitz, presumably in a regular passenger train together with Sinti from other towns en route-in a special passenger carriage with a group ticket, for which a group of fiy people or more paid half the third-class fare (Döring : ; Zimmermann : ). is explains why a striking number of groups of just over  people were deported in this transportation. On  March they were registered in the journal of the Gypsy camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau.
e bureaucratic robbery of those arrested had already begun in Hildesheim, where according to the Decree (Döring : ) they were to be deprived of their cash and bonds. e Hildesheim Sinti did not actually possess any bonds (and not many other Sinti will have possessed any either), but the criminal police succeeded in confiscating cash totalling . RM, a comparatively large sum, but more than one third of which alone (. RM) came from the head of one of the two Hildesheim families. e remaining amount was made up mostly of tiny amounts taken from  people, including the small wages which had been paid to the children in corrective care on being discharged from the reformatory school.⁶ is sum was later transferred by the criminal police headquarters directly to the Head Treasury (Oberfinanzkasse), painstakingly divided up according to owners and Revenue Offices.
e Gestapo was responsible for 'initially securing' the remaining wealth of the deportees (Döring : ; Schmid : -)-as in the case of the deported Jews-in the present case this being the Gestapo sub-office in Hildesheim. is first of all arranged for the assets to be secured 'provisionally' by the local authorities, the Head Mayors (Oberbürgermeister) of Hildesheim and Göttingen and the District Administrators (Landräte) of Holzminden and Peine.⁷  is can be deduced from the welfare records: NHStAH, Hann.  Göttingen, Acc. /, nos. , , , ,  and .
 Gestapo-Außendienststelle Hildesheim (Baumeister) an OFP Hannover,  June ' (correspondence): NHStAH, Hann. , Acc. /, no.  e legal basis for the ensuing bureaucratic procedure was the 'Law on the seizure of property of people hostile to the people and state' (Gesetz über die Einziehung volks-und staatsfeindlichen Vermögens) of  July , whereby a 'Law for the seizure of Communist property' (Gesetz zur Einziehung kommunistischen Vermögens) of  May  had been extended to embrace the Social Democrats, too.⁸ is law was extended to the Jews by a decree of the Reich's Finance Minister of  November  (Adler : , ), completely disregarding the facts, that German Jews were in their vast majority neither hostile to the state nor communist. e deportation of the Jews to the East was well under way at that point in time. However, since the th Ordinance relating to the Reich's Civil Code (Reichsbürgergesetz) was issued soon aerwards, on  November , providing for a simpler procedure, the  law was soon only applied to the Jews deported to Auschwitz and eresienstadt, which formally lay within the Reich (Schmid : -). e law was extended to the Gypsies by means of two decrees issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior: in the first decree of  November  it was belatedly declared that the 'Gypsies and Gypsy Mischlinge' who had been deported to the Generalgouvernement in May  'on the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht' had 'been enemies of the people and the state' (Rose : ); in the second decree of  January  the same was 'declared' for those due to be deported to Auschwitz-three days before the RSHA had even determined which class of peoples this affected in his express letter. e manner in which this 'declaration' is worded-namely 'that the activities of the Gypsy people, who were to be put in a concentration camp on the orders of the Reichsführer-SS of  Dec.  had been hostile to the people and state or Reich'-illustrates the utter absurdity of this legal construction (Döring : ) .
e procedure following the law of  was all the more complicated since it required directives authorising seizures to be issued by the intermediate government agencies-in Prussia these were the Heads of Administration (Regierungspräsident, hereaer RP)-which either had to be handed out to those affected together with a document acknowledging the receipt (Zustellungsurkunde) or had to be announced publicly. Despite this legal situation the Hildesheim Gestapo did not address the Hildesheim RP until a month aer the deportation, with the request that a collective seizure directive be issued. By way of justification it was argued-quoting the express letter of the RSHA almost literally-that it had not been possible to arrange for and deliver the seizure directives-as was the normal procedure in deporting the Jews-before the action took place, because 'under no circumstances were the prescribed measures to be made known beforehand in order to prevent the Gypsy people from departing early [. . .]' .⁹ In the case of the Sinti, unlike the German Jews, it was feared that the prospect of official measures would drive them into hiding-and not without reason, as we shall see.
Since the directives could no longer be delivered because they had been issued belatedly, only the second option remained open: public announcement. is had generally been carried out by publishing them in the Reichsanzeiger, but from September  onwards two-week public notification was sufficient.¹⁰ e Gestapo now applied for this quicker method. In addition, the request was also made that the collective seizure directive be sent before the two weeks had elapsed, so that it would be possible to clear the flats of the deported Sinti immediately. By now, the Gestapo in Hildesheim clearly regarded the seizure directives only as an annoying formality which did not need to be taken so seriously, as is underlined by the fact that they were also impertinent enough to ask the Hildesheim RP to include a few people in his collective directive who lived in Lehrte in the administrative district of Lüneburg, for whom he was thus not even responsible. e RP responded in a cool and correct manner. He informed them on  May-thus almost two months later-that he had sent the files for the Gypsies resident in Lehrte to the RP in Lüneburg responsible for them. At the same time he sent them several copies of his seizure decree, which had not been published in the Deutscher Reichsanzeiger until  May.¹¹ He was clearly not in any hurry. But the fact that the more time-consuming path had been taken appears to have been due rather to lack of awareness of the legal situation.¹² It was only now that the Gestapo were able to undertake further steps. On  June  they approached the OFP in Hannover with the request that he carry out the 'final utilisation' (endgültige Verwertung) of the deportees' assets, in other words that he seize and sell or auction them on behalf of the Reich.¹³ e Gestapo's task was thereby concluded. e Assets Utilisation Office (Vermögensverwertungsstelle) attached to the OFP was responsible for continuing the procedure. is office in turn commissioned the Revenue Offices responsible in Göttingen, Hildesheim, Holzminden and Peine to take the seized assets and-as it is literally stated-'to treat them like Jewish objects' .¹⁴ As a rule this meant that the assets were publicly auctioned by order of the Revenue Office.
In the case of the Sinti from Hildesheim the outcome of the assets utilisation is not known. But in general proceeds from the Sinti will not have been very great. In the case of the Sinti from Braunschweig, who were deported at the same time as the Hildesheim Sinti, the OFP in Hannover explicitly mentions 'few movable assets';¹⁵ in connection with a group of about  Sinti who were deported from Braunschweig at the end of March , the Gestapo reported that no valuables had been found on them at all.¹⁶ In Lüneburg, the auctioning of the possessions of two Sinti families brought in a total of . RM for the Lüneburg Revenue Office, with the greatest proceeds coming from the sale of two musical instruments, a violin for  RM and a hand accordion for  RM. From these proceeds the Revenue Office then had to settle rent arrears of  RM for the two flats from the time of the deportation till the auction.¹⁷ But any subsequent income was also recorded with great care, however small the amount was. us in August , the Braunschweig Gestapo reported to the OFP that outstanding wages due to the  deported Sinti to the amount of . RM had been seized, in April  a further  RM were reported, which was mainly the cash belonging to a Sinto that had been taken from him while on remand in Fulda.¹⁸  Gestapo-Außendienststelle Hildesheim an OFP Hannover,  June  (correspondence): NHStAH, Hann. , Acc. /, no. .
 Beschluss OFP Hannover,  June  (resolution): ibid.  e terminology suggests that in this estimation the assets of the deported Jews served as a yardstick: 'e few movable assets of the expelled Gypsies is to be used in the same way as the movables of the expelled Jews. ' e comparatively large sums of cash held by the Sinti-even the Braunschweig Sinti who were reported as utterly destitute had had . RM in cash confiscated¹⁹-can be explained by the fact that the Sinti as a rule had no bank accounts.
Case II: deportation of the family of a wealthy Sinto to Auschwitz, February 
But there was also the occasional quite affluent Sinto, such as the showman Karl Weiß of Osnabrück, who owned two pieces of property with blocks of flats for three and five families. In a estimate of the Osnabrück criminal police,²⁰ which records all  Sinti from Osnabrück who were deported to Auschwitz on  March , his wealth is shown as amounting to , RM. However, the list also confirms the overall impression: of the  Sinti listed,  were entirely without any form of wealth (albeit  of them were children under the age of ). So if one disregards Weiß, the other nine Sinti possessed valuables with an average real value of  RM, mostly consisting entirely of pieces of furniture and furnishings.
Somewhat less wealthy than Weiß was the carrier Wilhelm Friedrich, who owned a plot of land with a house in the Hannover suburb of Stöcken. His case is documented in the records more accurately. Friedrich was supposed to be arrested with his large family-a total of  people-by the criminal police on  February . is action was so badly prepared or carried out so casually that five members of the family were able to escape. Nor were they captured later, although the Gestapo was still maintaining on  March that their transportation to Auschwitz would 'soon ensue' .²¹ e twelve people arrested were deported to Auschwitz on  February . On  March the Gestapo applied to the RP in Hannover-belatedly as always²²- for a collective seizure directive to be issued that was not only to include the deportees, but also the five who had escaped arrest-on the grounds just stated. e Hannover RP did not view this as being amiss: on  March he issued the desired directive for the 'Gypsy Mischlinge who had been transferred to the concentration camp (Gypsy camp) in Auschwitz and for those who still needed to be transferred, some of whom were on the run' and had it hung up on the board in the building of the District Administration Court (Bezirksverwaltungsgericht) from  March till  April , thus formally visible to the public, de facto more or less hidden from public view.²³ On th April the Gestapo handed over Friedrich's assets to the OFP.²⁴ Among the valuables were four horse-carts and three horses with harnesses, which had been employed in air defence. In this connection, the head of the town of Hannover's vehicle park approached the OFP on th May: since as far as he could ascertain the horses were not being employed in the manner required by the war economy, he had decided to hand them over to 'someone in need of them, who would guarantee to employ and care for the horses correctly' . He therefore requested that the horses and carts be handed over to a horse-dealer 'nominated' by him aer an official estimate had been made.²⁵ at was what happened. e estimate produced a total value of , RM, of which ,. RM remained aer deducting the cost of the estimate. is amount was remitted by the horse-dealer Schmedes on  May . On the following day the Assets Utilisation Office remitted the remaining assets to the Revenue Office responsible for their further use or administration.²⁶ is included the house and plot of land with a rateable value of , RM, the proceeds from the furniture auction to the sum of ,. RM and the confiscated cash to the amount of RM ., thus totalling no less than , RM.
Even before it had been handed over, the OFP had let the property be transferred to the name of the German Reich and had ordered three mortgages benefitting Friedrich's children to be annulled. is was also carried out by the Lower District Court (Amtsgericht) in a routine manner, aer an enquiry about the legal validity of the seizure directive had been answered to their satisfaction and aer they had also been instructed by the OFP that the land register offices were not required to check 'whether in the case of registration requests submitted by the OFP the technicalities were really fulfilled' .²⁷ Aer the question of ownership had been sorted out, the OFP duly reported the property to the Head of Provincial Government (Oberpräsi-dent, hereaer OP). In accordance with a decree issued by Hitler on  May , it was possible to pass on assets or parts of assets that had been seized on behalf of the Reich free of charge to 'autonomous regional corporations' , if they could assist them in fulfilling their tasks. According to an implementation order of  April , in Prussia the OP was responsible for conducting the enquiry; in addition the Gauleiter responsible had to be informed.
In the present case the OFP discharged this duty on th August, informing those concerned at the same time that no appropriate body was known to be interested. To be on the safe side, he appended a description of the property, from which it was evident that the building was in a bad state of repair and that the flats had become neglected and were in need of repair.²⁸ e Braunschweig Gestapo managed to deal with a similar case quite peremptorily: Aer deporting the Braunschweig Sinti on  March , 'Gypsy waggons, huts and emergency housing' remained on the camp-site, which in the opinion of the Gestapo were 'in an unusable state, since some of them were made of completely rotten wood or other worthless materials' . On consultation with the Braunschweig Ministry of the Interior and the Head Mayor, 'who as an autonomous corporation would have been eligible for taking on this worthless accommodation if required, ' they were simply burnt down-with the standard argument from the repertoire of anti-Gypsy stereotypes that it was feared they might become the source of infectious disease and lice.²⁹ ere did not appear to have been a public body interested in the property in Stöcken, but two purchase applications were submitted by private people, who clearly sensed a bargain. In June  a lance-corporal on holiday leave in Stöcken enquired whether he might purchase the property, because he wanted to set up a horse-carrier business there aer the war, and in February  an invalid, who had run a carrier business earlier, but who in the meantime was employed as a messenger at the Technical University (Technische Hochschule), offered to take the property immediately with the horses and carts and to pay in cash. Both offers were turned down by the OFP on the grounds that the sale of seized property was frozen till the end of the war 'to give those Volksgenossen (people's comrades) at the front an opportunity to purchase property aer they had returned from the war' .³⁰ Clearly no-one in the fiscal administration reckoned with the possibility that the former owner might return. But this is precisely what did happen. Friedrich survived Auschwitz, returned to Hannover and moved back into his house in June , together with further survivors of his family, although the Revenue Office that was administering it had been renting it out since June . At first he obediently payed the Revenue Office the rent for his own house. It was only in November  that he refused to continue paying, and the fiscal official responsible-by the way, this was the same one who had been administering it since -recorded in a memorandum that 'for understandable reasons' he had refrained from obtaining the rent compulsorily.³¹ However, Friedrich's repeated applications for the restitution of his property were continually rejected, with reference being made to contrary resolutions made by the British Military Government for generally delaying the restitution of confiscated properties to get the time for thorough examinations. e situation remained thus until the administration of the property was transferred from the fiscal administration to the Lower Saxony Department for Supervising Frozen Assets (Landesamt für Beaufsichtigung gesperrten Vermögens) in May .³² as for the Jews. If applying the  laws against 'enemies of the Reich' to the deported Jews shows a high degree of arbitrariness, then extending them (belatedly at first) to cover the Sinti und Roma deported in  and extending them again in early  to cover all Sinti and Roma deported to Auschwitz comes close to absurdity. In the pratical implementation of these orders exactly the same decrees and regulations were applied. In the files this is made apparent on several occasions when expressions are used such as: the Sinti assets are 'to be treated like Jewish objects'³³ or 'to be utilised in accordance with the regulations issued for the utilisation of Jewish assets' .³⁴ It is of no surprise that the Hannover Revenue Office, to which the administration of Friedrich's property was assigned, initially referred to it as 'Jewish property' .³⁵ Furthermore, not only the same orders were valid, the same forms were oen used too, even long aer the end of the war, although aer  the term 'Jew' was-not as was done before-simply replaced by 'Gypsy' or 'Gypsy Mischling'.
us, although the legal basis and the structures used by the fiscal administration in dealing with Sinti and Roma were by and large identical with those of the Jews, the records of the Hannover fiscal administration do also show characteric variations in the way the Sinti and Roma were treated. e most obvious difference is in the fact that in the case of the Sinti the seizure directives were generally applied for and issued aerwards and then usually in the shape of collective directives. e reason for this is obvious enough: where Sinti were concerned one was afraid that due to their very different cultural background they would run away to escape deportation in much greater numbers than was the case with the socialised bourgeois German Jews. Since one could also assume that the bureaucrats carrying out the directives and the population were even less likely to express disapproval in the case of the Sinti than in that of the Jews, in the case of the former the legalistic cloaking of outright robbery in the shape of individual directives and documentary evidence of delivery was replaced by a summary procedure that turned it into a formality devoid of meaning.
e second difference is closely connected with the first, since it concerns those Sinti who despite all precautionary measures were able to go into hid- ing: eir assets were nevertheless seized for the benefit of the Reich, clearly without objections being raised, although this was hardly covered by the Declaration Decree of January . Both deviations show that the orders applied to the Sinti and Roma were in principle 'the same' , but they were applied even more in the sense of the prerogative state (Fraenkel ) than in the case of the Jews. It seems likely that this was a consequence of the traditional anti-Gypsy feeling in the bourgeois society and of the Gypsy policy and Gypsy jurisidiction in Germany which traditionally violated civil rights.
Translated from the German by Catherine Atkinson

